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President Bush warned in a 2005 address to the National Endowment for
Democracy that one of Islamism's goals is a trans-national Muslim theocra-
cy, technically a Caliphate - "a radical Islamic empire that spans from Spain
to Indonesia." Bosnia and Herzegovina is located at this expansive
Caliphate’s frontier, representing a legitimate radical Islamic threat to the
region. The ethno-religious nature of the 1990s Bosnian civil war introduced
materiel, moral and financial support from oil-rich Islamic Gulf states to sup-
port the beleaguered Bosnian Muslim government - with it came Saudi and
Wahhabi influence. More importantly was the entrance of Islamic foreign
fighters, or mujahadeen, bringing radical Islamic ideologies and, according
to some sources, the Al Qaeda network into Europe itself. The growth and
spread of Bosnia’s radical Islam, although limited, can be seen in activities
of Saudi sponsored Islamic institutions, the presence of mujahadeen, and
the recent arrests of Bosnians implicated in planning and sponsoring terror-
ist attacks. Even though the International Community is focused on Iraq and
Afghanistan as the US struggles in the Global War on Terror, the Balkans,
with its historical linkage to Islam and recent radical Islamic activity merits
close scrutiny. This paper investigates the distinct historical and spatial pat-
tern(s) associated with the growth and phenomena of Bosnia’s radical Islam




The historical presence of Islam in Bosnia, coupled with the influ-
ence of militant and radical Islam causes concern that Bosnia may
pose a terrorist threat. The Ottoman Empire’s conquest of the
Balkan peoples beginning in the 14th century is still manifested
today through the presence of Islamic communities and mosques
across the Balkan landscape. President Bush warned in an
October 2005 address that one of radical Islam's goals is a trans-
national Muslim theocracy, a Caliphate - "a radical Islamic empire
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that spans from Spain to Indonesia."1 Bosnia and Herzegovina is
located at the frontier between the Christian West and this
Caliphate, where a legitimate extremist menace exists. Although
the world’s attention is focused on Afghanistan and Iraq as the
US, NATO and the “Coalition of the Willing” struggle in the
Global War on Terror, the Balkan’s historical linkage to Islam and
recent radical activity merits increased vigilance. Moreover, recent
Department of State reporting highlights this concern, indicating
that Bosnia is an environment which could facilitate terrorist activ-
ities.2
Bosnia is governed by a weak central government and is popu-
lated by antagonistic national groups that may be allowing Bosnia
to transform into a radical Islamist sanctuary. This predicament
can be linked to the 1990s civil war in which foreign fighters, or
mujahadeen (holy warriors), from Islamic states supported the
Bosnian Muslim, or Bosniak, forces. The vast majority came from
the Middle East and North Africa and were provided financial and
political support by wealthy Gulf states. The support gave these
states an inordinate amount of influence in wartime and post-war
Bosniak politics, society and in the Muslim community. Many
mujahadeen still remain and are the source of great concern to
the Bosnian government and Western security services.3 The
wartime trauma of the Bosnia’s Muslim community coupled with
Bosnia’s stagnant economy and unfulfilled post-war expectations
has led to a noticeable tolerance and increase of radical Islamic
practice by some Bosniaks.
Bosnia’s Quandary
Bosnia’s frail central government institutions render the state virtu-
ally impotent in dealing with an Islamic threat without direct inter-
national support. The inability of the state to effectively control its
territory leaves a certain level of freedom for extremist elements to
operate in the “ungoverned” spaces found mostly in the rugged
terrain of central Bosnia. To further complicate the matter is the
sub-state political division of Bosnia into two entities, one the
Bosniak-Croat Federation (Federacija) dominated by the Bosniak
community and the other Republika Srpska controlled by the
Serbs. The Republika Srpska, and to a lesser extent the Croat can-
tons of the Federation, are anathema to any Muslim extremism.
Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, according to recent
reporting, are attempting to recruit so-called “white mujahadeen”
in Bosnia and other former Yugoslav territories.4 The radicaliza-
tion of many of Bosnia’s Muslims has led to the disaffection of
those who suffered in the civil war. Although most Bosniaks favor-



























organization of the country into the weak “two entity state” (figure
one) has left many disenchanted with not only the US but the West
in general. In addition, Bosniaks normally prize their close US
relationship and for the most part reject the imported radical
Islam, the influence of Islamic extremism cannot be discounted.
Indeed, there have been efforts by the Bosniak dominated gov-
ernment to look outside the West for material and moral support
to improve the economy and strengthen the central government.
Alarming to the US, Bosnian officials have stepped up interaction
with Iran, a known sponsor of terrorism, and other Islamic Gulf
states.
Figure 1 - Map of Bosnia & Herzegovina with the Federation and
Republika Srpska entities (source CIA).
There has been little rapprochement between the Bosniaks and
Serbs since the civil war’s end 11 years ago. Both entities are still



























political steps forward hard to achieve without active internation-
al involvement. As a weak state that lacks mechanisms to control
its security and law enforcement environment effectively, a setting
exists that is conducive to illegal movement of people, arms and
money within Bosnia and thus Europe. Bosnia is a state in which
the political discourse is dominated by ethnic hostility between the
Bosniaks who seek a stronger unitary state dominated by Muslim
Sarajevo and the Serbs who support the looser two entity arrange-
ment in which many state powers are maintained. The reappear-
ance of Haris Silajdzić in Bosnian politics and his party’s demands
for the abolishment of the RS has re-radicalized the political envi-
ronment, threatening the peace that has existed in Bosnia since
the signing of the Dayton Accords. In fact Dzevad Galijasević,
leader of the New Democratic Party of B-H and former mayor of
Maglaj, has accused Silajdzić of being a patron of terrorists and
hindering Bosnia’s fight against terrorism.5
Foreign Fighters - the Mujahedeen
The existence of foreign Islamic fighters in Bosnia since 1992 has
been well documented (Kohlmann, 2004, Shrader, 2003).
Numbers vary but estimates range from 700 in the first year of the
war to over 3000 mujahadeen in Bosnia by late 1995.6
Moreover, many Islamic volunteers and humanitarian aid workers
received Bosnian citizenship via the Bosnian Muslim government
during and following the civil war.
These foreign fighters arrived in Bosnia from Europe, North
Africa and the Middle East early in the war (figure two). By 1995
the ideological goals of the mujahadeen had transitioned from
helping their Muslim brethren to creating a frontline against the
West. Their goals were to spread jihad and develop an Islamist
base from which to strike Europe (Kohlmann, 2004, Trifkovic,
2002). They transited primarily through Croatia which was willing
to transfer men and materiel to support the Bosniaks in their com-
mon war with the Serbs.7 Logistical operations were coordinated
through purportedly charitable nongovernmental organizations
such as the “Third World Relief Agency,” the “Saudi High
Commission for Relief” and organizations like the Islamic Cultural
Institute in Milan, Italy.
The Bosnian civil war permitted the mujahadeen to establish Al
Qaeda’s terrorist network, that had been well developed in
Afghanistan, in Europe. The upswing in militant activities in
Europe in the mid 1990s is seen as a result of the inroads made
by radical Islam in Bosnia. The fighting and horrors being perpe-
trated against fellow Muslims by “Christian infidels” attracted
thousands of eager mujahadeen volunteers from North Africa, the38
Middle East, Pakistan and Europe - many still remain to this day
in Europe.8
Figure 2 - Map depicting the influx and relative numbers of
Mujahadeen into Bosnia from 1992-1995 (Oluic, 2006).
The presence of these foreign fighters caused incalculable suf-
fering as they attempted to Islamicize native Bosniaks, wage jihad
against the infidel (Serbs and the one time Bosniak allies the
Croats) and in developing their jihadist bases and network in
Bosnia. Although the Washington Accords signed in February
1994 stopped the Croat and Bosniak infighting, tensions
remained in central Bosnia in the Travnik and Zenica region. The
jihadist murders of Western aid workers and harassment of local
Christians were never challenged by the Bosniak wartime
President Alija Izetbegović’s central government out of fear of los-
ing the financial backing of the wealthy Middle Eastern states.
Another reason is Izetbegović’s own inclination to Islamicize
Bosnia.9 The deafening silence of the Bosnian government
towards the presence and activities of the foreign fighters cannot
be forgotten, as many of the current Bosniak political leaders are
affiliated with the wartime Bosniak nationalists and mujahadeen.
It is through this relationship many remain in Bosnia to this day
and have avoided deportation.39
September 11th’s Aftermath and Bosnia
Bosnia is in the process of deporting these foreign Islamic fighters.
This is an unfulfilled requirement of the 1995 Dayton Peace
Accords and due to Bosniak intransigence. The government
amended citizenship laws in 2006 and is finalizing the residency
status of these individuals. All Bosnians naturalized from April 6,
1992 to January 1, 2006 had their status and background inves-
tigated by the Commission for Review of Citizenship (CRC). This
effort has met with protest by many Bosniaks who complain that
the US is interfering in Bosnian sovereignty.
The 9/11 attacks on New York and the Pentagon has forced the
at times equivocating Bosniak dominated government to clearly
choose on which side they stood in the War on Terror. Indeed, it
served as a turning point bringing the Bosnian government in line
with America on the issue of international terrorism. Moreover, the
identification of at least two of the hijackers as having served in
Bosnian Muslim forces during the civil war led to increased and
critical scrutiny of Bosnia. Izetbegović was a casualty of this
change, resigning as the head of Bosnia’s leading nationalist
Muslim party, the Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA), one month
after the terror attacks. Izetbegović’s ardent support of the muja-
hadeen and numerous comments denying that any Bosnian con-
nection with Al-Qaeda or international terrorism became a polit-
ical liability for the Bosniaks and fodder for aggressive Bosnian
reporting uncovering his pro-mujahadeen activities. Izetbegović’s
departure, however, did not remove Islamists present in key posi-
tions within the SDA or Bosniak dominated government.10
Although post 9/11 Bosnia has made strides in combating the
image of a state complacent to radical Islam, it has taken 11
years to address the presence of foreign fighters. Bosnia’s ties with
Islamic states, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia, highlight the cozy
relationships that Izetbegović regime established with known
sponsors of terrorism during and after the 1992-95 civil war.
Although there has been extensive reporting of Iranian foreign
fighters in Bosnia during the civil war, this has been proven to be
false.11 There is a more sinister relationship that developed
between the wartime Bosnian Muslim government intelligence
service and VEVAK, the Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry.
Iranian intelligence operates today more actively through its diplo-
matic-consular representatives, but also through cultural, scientif-
ic, educational, and humanitarian organizations which are used
as a veil to cover intelligence work.12
Bosnia to some degree is being exploited as part of the world-
wide terrorist network of Al Qaeda. Open source intelligence
information provides examples of extremists using Bosnia as a
transit location for Al Qaeda operatives and arms/weapons ship-40
ments The October 19, 2005 Sarajevo detention of four men,
one Turk, one Swede of Bosnian origin and two Bosniaks, alarmed
Western governments. These individuals were planning suicide
attacks on Western Embassies in Sarajevo and their arrest led to
the further detention of four men in Copenhagen, Denmark plan-
ning suicide attacks elsewhere in Europe and the arrest of 17 men
in Canada this past June involved in a Canadian terror plot. 13
Since 9/11 Western intelligence services have been warning to
be on guard for travelers bearing Bosnian passports as some of
the most wanted terrorists acquired Bosnian citizenship during and
after the civil war. Not only were mujahadeen provided fraudulent
citizenship in Bosnia, Bosnia’s embassies and consulates the world
over issued passports to Islamic extremists. The discovery of
Bosnian passports in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Iraq have reju-
venated international demands that Bosnian step up its efforts to
combat Islamic extremism and better safeguard the issuing of
passports.
The Radical Islamic Influence on Bosnia’s Moderate Islam
Bosnia’s Muslims are generally members of the Hannafi school of
Sunni Islam, which is a more relaxed form of Islam that tolerates
differences within the Islamic community and has the reputation of
being moderate and relatively secular - hallmarks of Bosnia’s
Muslims (Bringa, 1995, Noel, 1994). However, the more conser-
vative Wahhabi sect, a subset of Salafism a rigid interpretation of
Islam, is also found today in Bosnia.
During Yugoslavia’s Tito’s era, many Bosnian Muslims received
religious training as exchange students to non-aligned Muslims
states such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria. Islamic influences can be
readily seen in Alija Izetbegović’s 1970 book “Islamic
Declaration” (re-issued in 1990) in which he advocated an Islamic
state in Bosnia and was critical of modern Turkey, advocating
Pakistan as a model. This book led to his arrest and imprisonment
by Tito. Its republishing helped fuel the nationalist intolerance
developing in Bosnia, moreover it reified the narrative among
Yugoslavia’s Christians that the goal of the Bosniaks was to create
an Islamic state.
Bosnia’s Islamic Community, Islamska Zajednica ( IZ), is a well
organized institution. It is headed by the Rijaset (Supreme IZ exec-
utive body) and led by the Reis ul-Ulema, Dr. Mustafa Cerić. In
September 2005 Dr Cerić was elected by the IZ’s Synodal
Assembly (Sabor islamska zajednice) to his second seven year
term. The IZ is believed to be the best organized and most com-
petent European Islamic Community. In fact the IZ has recently
expanded to include the large Bosniak community in Germany.



























point out that the Bosniaks are Western oriented by a large major-
ity and rarely practice their religion. The mannerisms, strong sec-
ularism, dress and occasional alcoholic beverage characterize
Bosnia as unique in the Islamic world. This is primarily true - but
chiefly in urban areas where young Bosniaks are largely well edu-
cated and politically passive. However it is disingenuous to por-
tray all Bosniaks as moderates - it ignores that portion of the
Bosniak community residing in remote rural areas and regions
severely traumatized by the war.
Bosnia’s Muslims receive their religious education today in the
IZ’s informal elementary religious schools (maktabs), Islamic high
schools (medresas), two academies that train Islam-religion teach-
ers, and lastly the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo.14 The
high schools are located in Cažin, Mostar, Sarajevo, Travnik,
Tuzla, and Visoko and; the academies are in Bihać and Zenica
(see figure one). In addition to Bosnian based medresas, there is
one each in Novi Pazar, Serbia and Zagreb, Croatia falling under
Bosnian Muslim jurisdiction. This religious education organization
is controlled by the Islamska Zajednica.
A parallel educational structure has developed outside the
Bosnian IZ’s control. Saudi funded Islamic Pedagogical
Academies have also been established in Bihać and Zenica and
peddle a much more conservative form of Islam to their Bosniak
students. From 2003 to 2004 approximately 100 Bosnian Islamic
studies students were enrolled overseas. Figure three depicts
which states sponsored the students. Saudi, or Wahabbi, influence
in Bosnia is considerable and detrimental to both Western and
Bosnian interests and seen as a threat to European security.
Indeed the entire Bosniak landscape is being remade with the






























Figure 3 - Approximate numbers of Bosniak students receiving
religious education in Islamic states (Oluic, 2006).
Sarajevo’s King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud Mosque & Cultural
Center was built in 2000 with Saudi funds and operates through
Saudi financing. Located in the suburb of Iliđza, it is a major cen-
ter of Wahabbism in Bosnia. The mosque, its medresa and admin-
istrative offices are under the control of the Saudis, not Reis Cerić
and the IZ - it enjoys a de facto extra-territorial status. Although
viewed skeptically by the IZ leadership, little can be done to
obstruct its radical activities. This situation is allowed to exist by the
Bosnian Federacija entity wherein Sarajevo lies, and Reis Cerić
has condoned a permissive environment doing little to thwart the
spread radical Islam.
Bosnia’s Radical Groups
The Active Islamic Youth (Aktivna Islamska omladina - AIO) is an
indigenous fundamentalist organization with the goal of promot-
ing an Islamic state in Bosnia and is the one organization in
Bosnia within the IZ that causes the most concern with ties to ter-
rorism and fundamentalist Islam.15 Established in Zenica in 1995
and associated with the mujahadeen the group’s main activities
has been to organize protests in opposition to Bosnian state action
against the foreign fighters, publishing promotional material and
books showcasing AIO’s religious and political extremist ideology.
Its Islamic weekly magazine SAFF and organization’s website,
have been fonts of radical Islamic preaching, gaining notoriety for
publishing interviews with terrorists who have fought against US
forces in Iraq and expressing solidarity with the jihadists and sui-
cide bombers in Israel.
Since 2002 the AIO has expanded to include computer and
internet facilities, multi-media Islamic libraries, offices and confer-
ence rooms in centers located in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Travnik,
Mostar, Zavidovići, Gornji Vakuf, and Sanski Most - all located in
the Federacija.16 In addition, the AIO has members throughout
the Bosniak Diaspora in Europe and the US. Through outreach
activities such as summer camps, internet cafes and youth centers
the AIO has been effective in recruiting young, disenfranchised
Bosniaks and raised suspicion in countries that host these Bosniak-
AIO sponsored camps. The appearance of bearded men and
women dressed in chadors in Sarajevo is noticeably increasing
and of great concern to residents who adhere to the traditionally
moderate form of Islam practiced in Bosnia. According to Western
sources the recruiting focus of radical Islamists in Bosnia are: (1)



























(3) rural communities in Bosnia, and (4) Bosnia’s Muslim poor
and disaffected. Recent surveys indicate that Bosnia’s Muslim pop-
ulations are concerned that the growth of radical Islam threatens
Bosnia’s future.17
The Muslim Brotherhood Group or Muslimansko bratstvo, is
smaller and less well funded than the AIO. However, it represents
a significant threat due to its prominence as a Bosnian Islamic
portal.18 Islam Bosna (www.islambosna.ba), the organization’s
website, offers promotional material, video clips and flyers typi-
cally denouncing US or Israeli aggression against the Muslim
world. Its advocating to establish an Islamic state in Bosnia, sym-
pathy with Hamas and destruction of Israel highlight concerns
about this website. Islam Bosna has supposedly distributed at least
80,000 copies of some of its posters and operates a well main-
tained and largely unregulated message boards and information
postings. This poses an exceptional threat given the grave con-
cerns recently of terrorist organizations utilizing radical Islamic
websites to pass information and conduct terrorist attacks.
Another concern is the Muslim Brotherhood Group’s success in
attracting Bosniak youth membership through its website.
According to the Nezavisne Novine daily in 2002 the oldest mem-
bers were just 25 years old.19 The use of the internet in recruiting
jihadists and I spreading radical ideologies has increasingly
become a focus of concern for Western intelligence agencies.
Islamic Banking, Zakat, & Shariah
Islamic banking is one of the fastest growing sectors of the
European banking industry and not surprisingly, where 40% of the
population is Muslim, Bosnia has become a new hub in this finan-
cial network. 20 Islamic banking simply complies with provisions
of Shariah law, dictating that Muslims cannot earn interest and
thus making specialist banking services necessary. Sarajevo-based
Bosna Bank International (BBI) was established on March 13,
2002 by some of the most powerful financial institutes in the Gulf,
including Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank and the Islamic Development
Bank in Jeddah. It is the only provider of Islamic banking services
in Bosnia. By 2007 BBI plans to have doubled the number of
branches in Bosnia and expand its internet and telephone bank-
ing services and call service center capabilities. Security services
in Italy have noted that traditional Islamic mustering points include
call centers, internet points, and money transfer offices - all close-
ly associated with modern banking facilities.21
Micro-banking or micro-financial activities are also a new phe-
nomenon that is altering the face of terrorist financing. Europol




























being closed down for their ties to radical Islam and terror, new
mechanisms are arising that continue to finance terror.22 Recent
scholarship has highlighted the ability of Al Qaeda’s adaptive
financing infrastructure to counter Western financial policy and
oversight efforts.23 Funding radical Islam and terrorism is becom-
ing increasingly local and substantial funds are still being raised
across the Islamic world without the ability of intelligence agencies
to monitor them.24
Zakat, an alms tax or tithe, is increasingly becoming a significant
source of terrorist funding. Difficult to track, these donations at the
local level are gaining importance. This suggests that due to the
effects of crackdown on large donors, charitable organizations,
and banks, terrorists are increasingly turning to micro-scale finan-
cial activities and collecting more donations from small donors.
The zakat as well as larger donations by wealthy Muslims called
the sadaqa are used to support the purposes of Islam without
accountability.25 In all likelihood this explains why counter
finance activities have done little to thwart terrorist operations and
even lethality since 9/11.26 The Islamic world’s outrage over the
GWOT and recent Israeli incursion into Lebanon has energized
this donor base into providing terrorism financial and moral sup-
port.
The lack of transparency in Islamic banking and charitable giv-
ing, provides an ideal infrastructure for radical Islamists and ter-
rorists to transfer money and makes it extremely difficult for count-
er terror organizations and financial regulators to collect intelli-
gence and map out their activities. The chronically short staffed
and under funded SIPA is hard pressed to overcome the cloak
concealing the potential or actual funding of radical Islam and
terror organizations in Bosnia today. This financial wealth gives
radical Islam power within the region and easy access to
weapons, explosives and even advanced technology. The efforts
to counter terrorist financing in Bosnia is an immature and devel-
oping front.
Bosnia’s Response to Radical Islam
Under great US pressure to deal with the allegations and realities
of foreign radical Islamist presence on Bosnian soil, the govern-
ment has empowered the State Information and Protection Agency
(SIPA) to grapple with issues of terrorism and has instituted the
Citizen Review Commission (CRC). On December 1, 2005, the
Bosnian Council of Ministers adopted draft amendments to state
laws giving the SIPA extensive power to combat terrorism.
Moreover, SIPA now possesses the authority to conduct security



























information. SIPA’s mission and structure closely resembles the US
Federal Bureau of Investigation; it is an institution of the Bosnian
state, not accountable to the entities, however it is chronically
understaffed and has been accused of being influenced by
Bosniak officials tolerant of extremist activity. Nonetheless, SIPA
has been very active since December in apprehending suspicious
individuals of North African and Middle Eastern descent found in
central Bosnia.27
The Citizen Review Commission estimated that approximately
15,000 citizenship certificates were issued and of that number,
1,500 naturalized Bosnians originate from countries outside the
former Yugoslavia.28 The CRC’s first quarterly report indicates
that a very serious problem existed in the issuing of Bosnian citi-
zenship to foreigners. During the war and after one could pur-
chase the required paperwork and many mujahadeen were grant-
ed citizenship fraudulently by the Izetbegović regime. A review of
the first batch of 50 citizenship certificates issued revealed that 38
of them were issued illegally.29
There have even been some grassroots efforts to draw attention to
the radical Islamic threat. Two former Bosniak members of the
radical Islamic movement and Wahhabi sect in Bosnia, Jasmin
Merdan and Adnan Mesanović recently published a book titled
“Wahhabism - Salafism” explaining in detail the differences
between the traditional and radical interpretations of Islam. While
well received in traditional Islamic circles, the book has been
vehemently criticized by the Bosniak adherents of radical Islam.30
Both authors claim that the presence of radical Islam is far greater
than realized. The recent stand by the Tuzla Cantonal government
to ban the activities of a “self-styled primary school" in Gornja
Maoca where teaching is in Arabic and adheres to Wahabbi ide-
ology indicates the increased willingness of Bosniak authorities to
confront radical Islam.
Political Ghosts from the Past
The political reappearance and election win of Haris Silajdzić (the
wartime Bosnian Muslim government foreign minister and politi-
cian) has added a new element to the political machinations in
and stability of Bosnia. A leading member of Izetbegović’s cabi-
net, he directly oversaw the importing of mujahadeen into Bosnia;
he brings this background to his new position as the Bosniak
member of the Bosnian Presidency and is viewed as hostile to
Serb, even Croat, interests. Silajdzić’s 2006 election platform’s
main message is to abolish the entities of Republika Srpska and
Federacija, something that the Serbs will never accept, and





























by the establishment of the Dayton Peace Accords entity arrange-
ment, guaranteed by NATO, now EU troops and the West’s polit-
ical and financial support.
Silajdzić’s campaign rhetoric has radicalized all elements of
Bosnian society and according to some, taken Bosnia back to
1995. The Serb leadership, under Prime Minister Milorad Dodik
who was also reelected in October, has maintained that if Silajdzić
and his Party for Bosnia (SBiH), continue to push for dissolution of
the entities then Republika Srpska will advocate secession.31 The
Croats have also led renewed calls for a third entity to represent
their interests and move out of their Bosniak partner’s shadow.32
The politics of Bosnia will be tense in the upcoming months.
The abolition of the entities would place Bosnia under the con-
trol of its Bosniak majority as they represent 40 to 45% of
Bosnians. Herein lies the problem, by a simple majority and via
the democratic process the Bosniaks would control the state. All
three national groups have shown over the last 15 years that they
vote along national lines. Silajdzić has been able to mobilize the
Bosniak voters to support his quest to dissolve the entities and
place the state under Bosniak control, centered in Muslim domi-
nated Sarajevo. The Iranian government’s pleasure at the election
results of Silajdzić victory and pledge of continued support in a
time which Iran is increasingly under Western pressure for its
nuclear program am and known state sponsored terrorism leaves
many Western diplomats in a state of consternation.33 It may
indicate a strengthening of ties between Iran and Silajdzić’s
Bosniak interests.
Given the influence of Islamic states in Bosnia’s Islamic
Community, continued relations with conservative Muslim politi-
cians and Silajdzić’s role as wartime foreign minister, a concern
becomes readily apparent that radical Islamic influence may grow
and thrive under the new Bosniak political leadership and new
direction. Establishment of Bosniak hegemony within the bound-
aries of Bosnia has become the major political objective with the
election of Silajdzić. The recent drive to give Srebrenica an
autonomous status, falling under the political jurisdiction of the
Federacija, has further enflamed nationalist aspirations.34 Of
some concern, should the Republika Srpska buffer challenging
radical Islam’s expansion in Bosnia disappear, Islam’s territorial
footprint in Bosnia would double. It is even imaginable the emi-
gration of Serbs out of Bosnia or even renewed war if secession is
unattainable - an environment especially conducive to radical
Islam’s expansion.
Observations and Concluding Thoughts
Radical Islam and Al-Qaeda’s influence on Bosnia has met with




























realized. Radical Islam is not popularly supported, nonetheless
vestiges of a transnational terrorist underground and radical
Islamic network was created in the heart of Europe. The London
and Madrid terrorist bombings have been tenuously linked to
Bosnia.35 Coupled with the recent arrests of suspected terrorists
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bangladesh, Britain, Canada,
Denmark, the US and over the past year indicates that the region
is clearly part of the global War on Terror.36 The Department of
State’s recent Country Reports on Terrorism explicitly stated that
Bosnia is “vulnerable to exploitation as a terrorist safe haven or as
a potential staging ground for terrorist operations in Europe”.37
The Islamska Zajednica should not be considered an immediate
radical Islamic threat. Its superb organization and territorial foot-
print is an excellent institution from which to enhance and main-
tain moderate Islam in the Balkans, or if left unchecked, a propo-
nent of radicalism. The adherents of radical Islam within the IZ,
such as members of the AIO, Muslim Brotherhood and holdover
wartime Bosniak political leaders are inculcated with a conserva-
tive Islam they believe is coupled to a successful centralized
Islamic Bosnian state. The recent funeral of Jusuf Barčić, a Medina
educated radical Islamic cleric, was attended by over 3,000
mourners from Bosnia and elsewhere in Europe indicates that the
presence and spread of radical Wahhabist ideologies is making
headway in the region.38
A generation of foreign militant Islamists have been given “safe
haven, training, financing, and ideological inspiration” within
Bosnia since the signing of the DPA and only recently under the
shadow of 9/11 has the Bosniak and Bosnian leadership
approached this threat.39 The support of foreign sponsors, such
as Iran and Saudi Arabia, and charitable and financial organiza-
tions that clearly advocate radical Islamic ideologies and terror-
ism are firmly planted in the Bosniak regions.40 Bosnia’s ability to
resist extremism and radical Islam depends on continued Western
engagement in the region and the recent phenomena of moder-
ate Bosniaks challenging the radical Islamists and their ideologies.
The election of Haris Silajdzić indicates that nationalist political
brinkmanship is back on the table, continuing to foster an envi-
ronment of national non-rapprochement. Moves by the Bosniak
leadership to create a stronger, unitary state centered in Sarajevo
should be carefully deliberated. Subsuming the Croats and Serbs
within a state absent entities assures Bosniak hegemony. However,
care must also be given to temper Bosniak demands without hav-
ing them resort to more drastic measures pursuing greater support
from radical Islamic states. In twelve years since the end of the
Bosnian civil war and signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, this
region finds itself once again on the global stage as it wrestles





























the abolition of the entities - a recipe for renewed crisis in the
Balkans.
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